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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing economic integration' of the twelve member European
Community2(EC) represents a milestone in European history and a turn-
ing point in Europe's relationship with the United States.3 This relation-
ship, multi-faceted, complex, and ever evolving, affects every aspect of
foreign and commercial policy. Of the commercial policy aspects of this
relationship, the continued competitiveness of both European and United
States industries remains among the most important. Although unfet-
tered, free access to world markets represents the ideal, such a goal is
unrealistic.
The interrelated world in which we live necessitates the interjection
of considerations other than competition into existing and future com-
mercial relationships. Political, social, and economic differences between
1. The European Community's merger is not only economic in nature, but political as
well. For convenience and relevance, however, this Article focuses solely on the directives and
regulations governing the removal of economic barriers among the EC members, rather than
the political ramifications or changes the Community is also experiencing. See Europe Without
Frontiers: Completing the Internal Market, 2 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION (1989) [hereinafter
Europe Without Frontiers]. For further reference to the overall integration process and its
impact, see The Effects of Greater Economic Integration Within the European Community on
the United States, USITC Pub. 2204 (July 1989) [hereinafter USITC Study].
The political ramifications of the EC integration are felt more strongly now than at any
time since 1985. For example, in January, 1990, the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA), comprised of non-EC members, declared its intention to be irreversibly bound by any
decisions rendered by the EC in establishing complete economic integration. Statement of the
Hon. Auke Haagsma, First Secretary for Legal Affairs, Meeting of the European Community
Delegation, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 10, 1990). This decision is surprising and enlightening
since EFTA takes great pains to maintain a separate identity from the EC community. Id. The
political ramifications of this decision include an increase in the size of the potential market
available to United States industries trading with Europe, plus the possibility that EFTA may
at some point become subsumed in the new European economic identity.
The members of EFTA are Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, and Austria.
Austria has formally applied for membership in the EC, but no decision has been rendered on
its application.
2. The original member states of the EC as signatories to the Treaty of Rome were:
Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47 (Cmd.
455) [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (original version at 298 U.N.T.S. 11). The United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Ireland joined in 1972. See Act of Accession, Jan. 22, 1972, 1979 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 18 (Cmd. 7463). Greece joined in 1979, see Act of Accession, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
291) 3 (1979), and Spain and Portugal joined in 1985. See Act of Accession, 28 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L. 302) 5 (1985).
The primary institutions of the EC include: the EC Commission, the Council of Minis-
ters, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. EEC Treaty, supra note 2,
art. 4, at 83.
3. See Reaction "Touchy" on Implications of Unified Europe, WASHINGTON TRADE
WEEK, Oct. 31, 1989, at 4; Stanford, "Europe 1992" Some See Opportunity; Some See Threat,
CONG. MONITOR, May 15, 1989, at 2.
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the United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, and the rapidly changing
Eastern bloc require the imposition of trade controls between "East"4
and "West ' 5 nations. These controls, albeit anathema to the general
spirit of competition and free trade,6 are essential to the political survival
of existing international relationships between the East and West.
This Article analyzes the effects the integration of the European
Community will have on existing and proposed United States export con-
trol laws. As one of the superpowers, the United States has developed an
extensive framework of export and re-export control laws, designed to
achieve one goal: to prevent critical technology affecting national secur-
ity or foreign policy from being transferred to the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc. These laws,7 dating back to 1949, provide for elaborate
licensing procedures to verify the nature and scope of technology, goods,
or services being transferred. Under this statutory framework, licenses
can be denied for national security,8 foreign policy,9 or short supply rea-
sons.' 0 Each of these denials represents inhibitions on free trade and
competition, inhibitions both United States and European industry have
come to resent."'
4. The term "East" as used in this Article will refer to the Soviet Union and its satellite
or affiliated nations, including Albania, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic. At the time of publication, dramatic
changes within the Eastern bloc indicate that an eventual modification of this definition may
occur.
5. The term "West" as used in this Article refers to the nations of Western Europe,
Australia, Japan, Iceland, and the United States.
6. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (VoL II): Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 5-8 (1987) (statement of the Hon. Edward J. Derwinski, Counselor of the
Dep't of State) [hereinafter Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987].
7. See, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West
Supp. 1989); Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2751 (West Supp. 1989); Export Ad-
ministration Act Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 768-768.4 (1989); International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-120.25 (1989).
8. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404 (West Supp. 1988).
9. Id. § 2405.
10. Id. § 2406. Under each category noted in footnotes eight and nine, foreign availability
assessments determine the likelihood of a controlled country obtaining critical goods or tech-
nology from sources other than the United States. Foreign availability determinations repre-
sent the foundation upon which licenses for export are denied on national security and
sometimes foreign policy grounds. See, e.g., id. §§ 2404(f), 2405(h). The Commerce Depart-
ment has proposed some changes to the regulations governing foreign availability which have
not been well-received by industry. Industry Groups Criticize Proposed Changes in "Foreign
Availability" Regs, [8 No. 2] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 13-14 (Jan. 12, 1990).
11. See, e.g., Polsky, Legislation Would Streamline Export Control Procedures, DEFENSE
NEWS, Oct. 30, 1989, at 25 (commenting on the extensive frustration experienced by United
States industry with export controls and procedures); Senators Introduce Bill to Streamline
Government's Export Control Procedures, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, 1411 (Nov. 1,
1990]
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The economic integration of the EC will shift the focus of these con-
trols. Integration removes controls at European borders which the
United States once relied upon to enforce its export laws. United States
export and trade laws, therefore, must adjust to accommodate this new
perspective. This adjustment should include the elimination of re-export
authorization and extraterritorial application of United States laws in
favor of broader agreement on Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Exports [hereinafter COCOM] list inclusions, implemented by individual
nations' laws.
Although Congress professes to be interested in accommodating in-
ternational interests in order to make United States industry internation-
ally competitive, 12 it has not moved quickly enough, either in amending
the Export Administration Act of 19791' or in creating the multilateral
export control violations section of the Multilateral Export Control En-
hancement Amendments Act. 4 Both of these amendments maintain or
extend, rather than decrease, the extraterritorial application of United
States laws, and provide for renewed sanctions in the event of viola-
tions.' 5 Although the European reaction to the amendments has thus far
been minimal, there is no reason to believe that the members of the Euro-
pean Community will not express distress over the repeated incursions of
United States laws on European Member States sovereignty.'
6
This Article discusses four separate but interrelated topics. Section
II provides a basic outline of the changes transpiring in Western Europe
as it moves towards completion of its economic integration, including a
1989); see also Export Controls: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetary
Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 97-
137 (1987) [hereinafter Export Controls Hearings].
12. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2402(1) (West Supp. 1989). Congress explicitly states that it is
"the policy of the United States to ... encourage trade with all countries with which the
United States has diplomatic or trading relations," id., and to convince industry to "use its
economic resources and trade potential to further the sound growth and stability of [the U.S.]
economy." Id. § 2402(4). The goals are laudable, but are contradicted by some of the restric-
tions broadly stated and found within the same statutory section. See, e.g., id. §§ 2402(7),
2402(8), 2402(13), 2402(15).
13. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 1107, 1347 (to be partially codified at 50 U.S.C.A.
app. §§ 2401-2420 (West Supp. 1989)).
14. Id. at 1364-70 (partially codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a (West Supp. 1989)).
15. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a(b) (West Supp. 1989).
16. See Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887
(1985). Ambassador Kenneth W. Dam notes that West Europeans chafe uncomfortably under
the yoke of extraterritorial application of United States laws. Id. at 889. The United States
must prepare itself for further resistance to these types of laws as economic and political inde-
pendence and interdependence grows. If American business wishes to remain competitive, the
United States must consider reducing its extraterritorial reach. See id. at 888, 890.
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review of representative directives outlining strictures, or lack thereof, on
the movement of goods and services within the community. Since
United States goods exported to the EC may also be re-exported to other
EC countries, removal of intra-European controls over the movement of
such goods will affect the ability of the United States to control the re-
export of such goods.
Section III examines United States export control laws likely to be
affected by the EC integration. The Export Administration Act of 1979
(EAA), the Arms Export Control Act, and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA), amending the EAA, represent the
most likely candidates. These statutes and their concomitant regulations
affect both the export and re-export of goods, services, and technology to
Western Europe and the Soviet Union. In addition, these statutes are
designed to work in conjunction with the COCOM"7 list which is gener-
17. The acronym "COCOM" stands for the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Ex-
ports. Its primary purpose is to prevent the acquisition of critical Western technology by
Eastern bloc nations. G. SCHIAVONE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A DICTIONARY &
DIRECTORY 67, 67 (2d ed. 1986). The organization is informal, based solely on a voluntary
agreement among its seventeen members. Originally established in 1949, it is designed actually
to deny the Soviet Union and its allies all access to technology which could enhance any of
those nations' militaiy capabilities. Telephone conversation with Ed Cummings, Office of the
Legal Advisor, Department of State (Mar. 1, 1990). Not all technology is prohibited to the
Soviets, but COCOM developed and presently maintains three separate lists defining what
goods are or are not exportable. Each list proscribes the export of specific types of goods or
technology. See TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PANEL OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ARMED SERV-
ICES, 48TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT 8 (Comm. Print 1984).
The International Munitions List defines actual weapons systems which may not be ex-
ported, and is comparable to the United States Major Defense Equipment List used by the
Department of Defense and military branches to deny export licenses on certain specified
weapons or defense systems. See DEFENSE SEC. ASSISTANCE AGENCY, DOD 5105.38-M, SE-
CURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT MANUAL, table700-6, at 700-20 (1989). The Interna-
tional Atomic Energy List references radioactive materials and the International List, much in
the same way that the United States Commodity Control List (recently renamed the "Control
List") itemizes dual use items, those items with both a military and commercial application
whose exports are prohibited or controlled. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R.
§ 799-799.2 (1989).
For all its good intentions, however, COCOM has no enforcement authority. See G.
SCHIAVONE, supra, at 66-67; see also McIntyre & Cupitt, East-West Strategic Trade Control:
Crumbling Consensus, [25 No. 1] SURVEY 80, 82 (1980). It is self-policed by the individual
signatories, but the organization itself imposes no punishments upon violators of the various
proscriptions. Id. Each member implements its own national export control policy. Id. In
conjunction with the individual laws some seventeen separate control lists exist, in addition to
the COCOM lists. Id. Enforcement and coordination lead to confusion and numerous re-
peated violations (for example, the ability of Toshiba-Konigsberg to export critical submarine
technology to the Soviet Union without much notice). See Comment, Controlling the Transfer
of Militarily Significant Technology: COCOM After Toshiba, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 863
(1988).
COCOM, however, represents one effort at unifying controls on exports so that national
1990]
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ated by a multilateral organization comprised of seventeen countries
whose primary goal is to prevent the unauthorized export of militarily
critical technology to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc. Every member
of the EC is also a member of COCOM,18 and this dual membership
raises additional interesting issues. Among the questions is whether the
EC integration will affect not only United States export laws, but the
parameters and authority of COCOM.
Presently COCOM determines multilateral export policies, although
COCOM members each have separate, national policies regarding ex-
ports.19 Whether the economic restructuring of the EC will result in a
diminishment of Member States' national laws and policies remains to be
seen. If it does, however, the United States then must refocus its export
and re-export control policy to consider the possibility that COCOM
alone may be the party with whom negotiations take place.
Section III discusses in detail the Multilateral Export Control En-
hancement Amendments Act.20 The Multilateral Export Control Statute
mandates that the exporting of goods that result in an enhancement of
Soviet or East bloc capabilities in certain strategic defense areas be pun-
ished through the imposition of sanctions or penalties.21 The law, how-
ever, applies specifically to "foreign persons" and represents another
attempt at extraterritorial application of United States laws. Once again,
the reception within the European Community is expected to be cool at
best.
Section IV discusses the actual impact EC integration will have on
United States export control policy, rules and COCOM, including a re-
view of some changes already in progress. Although the United States
policies of individual members will not clash continuously. As with any organization, it re-
quires fine tuning and more support. For additional insight into COCOM, see Aeppel, The
Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical Study of the COCOM Regime, 9
FLETCHER F. 105 (1985).
18. The following members of the EC are also members of COCOM: the United King-
dom, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxem-
bourg, Portugal, and Spain. The only member of the EC not also on the Coordinating
Committee is Ireland. Telephone conversation with staff member of the Office of COCOM
Affairs, Dep't -of State, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 21, 1989). The remaining members of
COCOM include: Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Turkey, and the United States.
19. U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPORT CONTROL
SYSTEMS PURSUANT TO SECTION5(B)(2) OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 As
AMENDED By SECTION 2415(A) OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE & COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988
(1988). The Department of Commerce conducts periodic review of COCOM members' export
control policies in order to verify the efficacy of their programs. Id. Due to the sensitive nature
of the inquiry, the Department has yet to produce one report.
20. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a (West Supp. 1989).
21. Id. § 2410a(b).
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executive and congressional branches accept the precept that unilateral
export control policies do not result in successful prevention of diversions
or illegal exports,22 it is unlikely that the United States Congress will
permit the removal of all export or re-export authorization over the inter-
national movement of United States goods or services. The Department
of Commerce, as well as other agencies, is keenly aware of the damage
such a philosophy portends for the competitiveness of United States in-
dustry and has lobbied Congress strenuously for the elimination of extra-
territorial application in exchange for an increase in United States
competitiveness.23 To date, Congress has chosen to pursue a more cau-
tious approach than that advocated by the Department of Commerce as
early as 1984.
Section IV concludes that further change in United States export
22. See Removal of Unilateral National Security Controls; Additional Controls on Chem-
icals and Biological Agents and Precursors, 54 Fed. Reg. 8,281 (1989). The utility of unilat-
eral controls is minimal, at best. Final rules recently approved remove unilateral national
security control restrictions on certain exports. Id. These rules express the executive branch's
view that unilateral controls are ineffective.
Presidential and congressional concern over the continued use of unilateral controls ne-
cessitated a year long study by the National Academy of Sciences, which published its report
in 1987. A distinguished panel of commentators, attorneys, researchers, and foreign policy
experts examined all facets of unilateral controls and concluded that the controls no longer
fulfilled the security needs for which they were originally designed. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCE, BALANCING THE NATIONAL INTEREST: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CON-
TROLS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC COMPETITION 15-20, 23-27 (1987).
The panel further concluded that cooperative efforts, such as greater utilization of
COCOM mechanisms, will more readily protect against improper technology and goods trans-
fer than would any unilateral action on the part of the United States. Id. at 15-20. This author
concurs completely with the panel's conclusions. See also Export Controls Hearings, supra note
11; Comment, Failures in the Interagency Administration of National Security Export Controls,
19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 537 (1987); Hirschhorn & Tasker, Export Controls: Toward a
Rational System for Everyone Except Toshiba, with All Deliberate Speed, 20 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 369 (1989). Some of the lobbying has been extremely successful. The Department
of Defense recently agreed to relax their review of exports to East European countries under-
going dramatic democratic changes as well as exports to U.S. allies. This policy shift repre-
sents a milestone in the DOD approach to general export policy. Although DOD does not
issue licenses itself, its agreement to the reductions eases export reviews by Commerce and
State Department officials. See Amouyal, U.S. to Slash Controls on Exports to E. Europe, Pro-
tect Some Items, DEFENSE NEWS, Apr. 2, 1990, at 9; House Members Press for Easing Restric-
tions on High-Technology Sales to Eastern Europe, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 394
(Mar. 21, 1990).
23. See Omnibus Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 9-10 (statement of Hon. Paul
Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary for Trade Admin., Dep't of Commerce); see also Auerbach,
U.S. Drafting Plan to Relax Technology Export Curbs, Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1989, at Fl,
col.1; Administration Said to Be Considering Changes on Export Controls, [7 No. 50] INSIDE
U.S. TRADE 1, 14 (Dec. 15, 1989). But see Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra
note 6, at 27 (former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger suggests sacrificing United
States sales for the sake of national security).
1990]
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policies and laws is inevitable. The integration of the EC, coupled with
the rapid changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and contin-
ued concern over the lack of United States competitiveness will force the
United States to implement the changes necessary to regain competitive-
ness.24 It will also inspire United States industry to seek alternative solu-
tions to the existing cumbersome, anachronistic licensing process.
Section V suggests that Congress may wish to repeal certain export
control laws in favor of a diplomatic solution which can be enforced, a
solution the executive branch has already recognized.25 This repeal
should be replaced by a strengthening of COCOM through a formaliza-
tion of its existence and an augmentation of its enforcement authority,
plus the adoption of "license free zones" among EC members and the
United States. These changes will provide advantages to both the United
States and the European Community.
The EC will no longer be subject to the extraterritorial application
of United States law, which has been a source of friction between the
United States and the EC for at least the past twenty years. The United
States will be better able to continue influencing and setting export con-
trol policy which enhances national security without sacrificing indus-
trial competitiveness. A true multilateral approach, achieved through
negotiation and understanding of Western European motivations, will re-
sult in increased success in avoiding diversion of critical or high technol-
ogy goods to the Soviet Union or Eastern bloc.
Now that tensions with the Soviet Union have eased, a relaxation of
controls will be sure to follow. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher
already has called for quick and increased reduction of export restric-
tions.26 Moreover, the ultimate goal behind the United States export
control laws, to avoid diversion of critical technology, can be more easily
achieved through cooperative, rather than unilateral means.
24. See, e.g., U.S. Seen Likely to Relax Present Ban on High Tech Exports to Poland,
Hungary, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 1650 (Dec. 20, 1989); Commerce Secretary
Mosbacher Foresees 'Significant'Shortening of Controls List, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49,
at 1620 (Dec. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Mosbacher Forsees]; Some "Changes" Possible in U.S.
Controls on High Tech Exports, U.S. Official Says, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1620,
1620-21 (Dec. 13, 1989); Western European Countries Recommend Easing of Restrictions Set
By COCOM, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 1591 (Dec. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Easing
COCOM Restrictions]; see also supra note 23.
25. See Auerbach, supra note 23; Agencies Seek to Improve Procedures for Reviewing Ex-
ports to Communist World, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1507, 1507-08 (Nov. 22,
1989).
26. Auerbach, supra note 23; see also 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a(b) (West Supp. 1989).
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II. THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The trifold goals of Europe's economic integration are: (1) to enable
industrial cooperation, (2) to promote social cohesion, and (3) to estab-
lish a dynamic, open commercial policy.27 The EC has chosen to adopt a
customs union to achieve these aims.
A. Theory
The Treaty of Rome established a European customs union, the
foundation of EC integration.28 Under this theory, the European Com-
munity becomes one geographical trading area "wherein the Member
States reduce trade barriers among themselves and adopt common barri-
ers against the rest of the world."'29 The removal of these trade barriers
includes the elimination of all physical, technical, and financial barriers
to the movement of goods and services. The removal of barriers results
in increased competition, greater efficiencies, and better prices for con-
sumers. Although other economic theories 30 could have been used, a
customs union provides the EC with a satisfactory mix of integration and
retention of national interests.31
The 1985 White Paper32 outlined the detailed methodology whereby
the EC could establish the single largest world market for trade purposes,
a market which would work to the benefit of both the Europeans and
their trading partners. The White Paper also stated that the establish-
ment of the customs union should be achieved through the use of regula-
tions and directives. 33  The process of drafting and implementing
27. See Europe Without Frontiers, supra note 1, at 7.
28. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(a)-(c), at 83.
29. USITC Study, supra note 1, at 2-5.
30. Several other types of trading groups exist, most notably preferential trading commu-
nities (PTCs) and free trade areas (FTAs). Each varies from the customs union slightly but
significantly. PTCs involve groupings of member states by geographic region, in which the
individual member states reduce internal trade barriers between members, but maintain their
respective external barriers against the remaining trading partners. FTAs are PTCs whose
internal barriers have been completely eliminated, but whose external barriers remain the
same. The customs union provides for an elimination of internal barriers and a replacement of
external barriers by a common set of rules against the rest of the trading world. USITC Study,
supra note 1, at 2-5 n.l.
31. Statement of the Hon. Auke Haagsma, supra note 1.
32. Commn of Eur. Comm., Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85) 310 final (June 14, 1985).
33. Five methods to implement the plan expressed in the 1985 White Paper and the
Treaty of Rome exist. Each varies in its binding effect and scope. Regulations are the most
sweeping in that they are binding on all members in their entirety, without regard to individual
Member States' laws, and are self-implementing. Due to their breadth, they are infrequent and
1990]
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directives has been slow, but it will be completed by 1992.3"
While the formation of the customs union occurred in 1958, the im-
plementation of the theory did not begin until 1985. As such, the imple-
mentation has met with international resistance, mostly out of fear or
uncertainty as to the ultimate result of the effective union.35 The most
frequent objections revolve around the idea that Europe will become a
"fortress," closed to the freer aspects of trade.36 These views have been
only take effect if no Member State objects. Regulations usually define fundamental principles.
They originate with the EC Commission and are adopted by the EC Council. See USITC
Study, supra note 1, at 1-18.
Decisions are also binding in their entirety, but apply solely to the individual legal issue
addressed. They may also apply either to particular Member States or to individuals. Id. Deci-
sions may be subject to judicial review under certain circumstances. Id.
Opinions and recommendations are nonbinding and may be freely reviewed by the EC
Court of Justice. Id. They express the EC Council's or Commission's opinion on particular
situations, whereas recommendations provide suggestions to the addressee on possible routes
of action. Id. The EC Council and the EC Commission freely give both recommendations and
opinions.
Directives provide individual Member States with the greatest discretion and freedom.
Directives are binding upon those to whom they are addressed, but are not self-implementing.
Id. Each individual member government must pass implementing legislation in order for the
directive to be effective. Id. Some Member States are slow to respond when implementing
legislation must be passed. See COM(88) 425 (Oct. 3, 1988).
34. All twelve members of the EC are behind in passing national legislation implementing
approved directives. Some members, however, are further behind than others, with Italy and
Greece being the most egregious offenders. The chart below summarizes the number of direc-
tives passed and implemented since December31, 1987.
Directives applicable Directives transposed
Member as of as of
State Dec. 31, 1987 Dec. 31, 1987
Belgium 795 637
West Germany 795 663
Denmark 779 649
France 790 652






USITC Study, supra note 1, at 1-19 n.154; see also EC Members Lagging Behind in Implement-
ing Directives Needed for 1992 Single Market, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1166, 1166-
67 (Sept. 13, 1989); Jones, Putting "1992" in Perspective, [9 No. 3) Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
463, 466-67 (1989).
35. See infra note 36.
36. Several authorities have argued against the notion that Europe's union will create a
new "Fortress Europe." See, e.g., Bangemann, Fortress Europe: The Myth, [9 No. 3] Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 480, 484 (1989); U.S. Manufacturing Firms View 1992 as Welcome Opportu-
nity, Survey Shows, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 709 (May 31, 1989); "Fortress Eu-
rope" Fears Exaggerated, Harvard Professor Tells House Panels, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
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discounted by members of the EC Commission and Parliament, and by
official statements of the EC delegation in the United States.37 Even
United States commentators have stated that a customs union yields
more economic efficiencies and greater competition overall, thereby ne-
gating the view that Europe will become a closed market.38
B. Directives Affecting Free Movement of Goods
The key to removal of trade barriers stems from the EC directive
requiring the free movement of goods intra-Europe.39 While simplifying
customs, financial, and transportation matters, the removal of trade bar-
riers also results in an increase of trade. However, the increase in trade
and unrestricted movement of goods will result in less accountability, a
natural by-product of both the Treaty of Rome and the free movement of
goods directives.
The most numerous examples of directives liberalizing movement of
goods involve customs and border checks. For example, the Council
Regulation of December 21, 1988, 4 abolished all exit formalities at all
9, at 265 (Mar. 1, 1989) [hereinafter "Fortress Europe'; U.S. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
THE EC INTERNAL MARKET, INTERNAL MARKET PUB. Doc. 1288, AN INITIAL ASSESS-
MENT OF CERTAIN ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY ASPECTS OF THE EC's PROGRAM
(Dec. 1988). The Honorable Karl M. Meessen identified the most compelling reason for the
failure of a "Fortress Europe" argument: the existence of twelve individual personalities repre-
senting twelve individual nations on the EC Council.
The principle decisions under all the trade policy instruments have to be adopted by
the Council of Ministers. The Council should not be mistaken for a government of a
nation state. It is a conglomerate of twelve such governments that, based on different
economic philosophies and composed of different political parties, often have quite
different priorities of industrial policy in mind when it comes to taking specific deci-
sions in a trade conflict. The 1992 project will not affect the institutional constraints
of European decisionmaking.
Meessen, Europe en Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market and its Impact on
Non-Europeans, 23 INT'L LAw. 359, 360 (1989); see also Statement of the Hon. Auke Haag-
sma, supra note 1. But see Commerce Rethinking View of EC-92; Sees Possible 'Fortress Eu-
rope,' [7 No. 50] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 12-13 (Dec. 15, 1989).
37. See, eg., Statement by Sir Leon Britton, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 809
(June 21, 1989) (in the bank licensing context); Europe Without Frontiers, supra note 1, at 1-27.
38. I d; see also "Fortress Europe," supra note 36.
39. Title I of the Treaty of Rome provides the foundation for the free movement of goods.
The title discusses and outlines the theory and tools for implementing this goal. EEC Treaty,
supra note 2, arts. 9-37, at 86-93. These articles were memorialized in a series of regulations
and directives removing technical, financial, and physical barriers to the movement of goods.
See, eg., CouncilRegulation No. 3/84, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 2) 1 (1984); Council Regu-
lation No. 2823/87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 270) 1 (1987); Council Regulation No. 1062/
87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 107) 1 (1987); Council Directive No. 83/643, 26 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 359) 8 (1983).
40. COMM'N OF EUR. COMM., COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: THE ELIMINA-
TION OF FRONTIER BARRIERS AND FISCAL CONTROLS 13 (Dec. 1988).
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common border posts at internal Community frontiers, effective July 1,
1989. Specific rules place the onus on the office of entry 1 to process any
controls for the movement of goods. Goods accompanied by an ATA
carnet,42 a Community movement carnet,4" or a form 302' may be
checked through the office of entry and no other border.45
A second regulation developed one uniform customs form for all
goods traversing intra-EC.46 Instead of seventy-four different adminis-
trative applications, exporters or importers may file the single EC cus-
toms form. Administrative simplification produces quicker border
checks at offices of entry.
Fiscal regulations and directives also alleviate economic constraints
on the movement of goods. Council Regulation No.1674/8747 of June
11, 1987, removed the requirement for guarantees of duty payments and
fiscal charges arising from any internal transit operations within the EC.
Under certain residency circumstances, exporters and importers may
now apply for and receive waivers for these guarantees.48
Proposed Council directives provide for the establishment of a single
value added tax (VAT) market within the Community.49 Under this di-
rective, any VAT charged on EC imports from other EC members will be
fully deductible."0 However, imports from non-EC members will still be
subject to taxes.5"
The purpose of these measures is to provide administrative and eco-
41. Id. § 1.4(3)(1). As opposed to the office of entry, the office of exit is defined as "the
customs office at the border of the Member State through which the goods have just traveled."
Id. § 1.4(3)(2).
42. An ATA carnet is "[a] document that can be used to effect the temporary admission
of certain items into a country without completing normal customs formalities." W.J.
MILLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 16 (1985).
43. A community movement carnet is a general customs document issued by the EC,
authorizing the movement of goods throughout the community. Id.
44. Form 302 is one type of community movement carnet.
45. Separate regulations exist covering TIR carnets and movement of goods under these
permits. 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 341) 1 (1986); 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 144) 7 (1987).
The formalities and checks applying to movement of goods under ATA carnets and forms 302,
apply to TIR Carnets as well. See 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 144) 4, 7-8 (1987).
46. See EC Commission Takes First Steps Towards Harmonizing Customs Rules, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1483-84 (Nov. 15, 1989).
47. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 157) 1 (1987).
48. Waivers will be granted to operators moving goods who are "resident in the Member
State where the waiver is granted; regular users of the Community transit system; in a healthy
financial position; [and] not guilty of any serious infringement of customs of fiscal laws." See
COMM'N OF EUR. COMM., supra note 40, at 9.
49. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 252) 2 (1987).
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id.
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nomic simplicity to further the free movement of goods. However, the
removal of trade barriers also reduces the accountability of goods once
they enter the EC. Accountability is essential for those goods whose
trade is restricted due either to individual Member State laws or interna-
tional obligations. The more directives which contribute to this liberali-
zation, the more difficult it will become for the United States to apply its
own export laws extraterritorially to EC members.52 Whether this liber-
alization was inadvertent or by design, it alleviates some EC irritation
over the extraterritorial application of United States export and re-export
laws-an irritation which the EC has borne for well over twenty years.
In order for the United States to adjust to this removal of internal
restrictions in the EC, it must reassess its licensing of exports and revamp
its overall export policy.
C. EC Export Control Policy
Although individual EC members have separate export control
laws, 3 the EC as a whole has also adopted a regulation governing ex-
ports.5 4 In effect since December 20, 1969, and binding upon all mem-
bers, the regulation calls for complete liberalization of exports with third
countries in all but the most unusual of circumstances.5 5 The export of
products shall be free (i.e. not subject to any quantitative restrictions)
except for certain protective measures triggered by critical situations
within individual Member States.56 This policy, however, does not di-
rectly allow for control of exports to the Soviet Union.57
Although the regulation speaks to general policy on exports, it still
provides for limited autonomy within Member States.58 Since the regula-
tion has not been amended since 1977, and the movement towards a
more uniform export policy continues, a trading partner must still ex-
amine an individual Member State's export control laws to determine
what impact the liberalization of the movement of goods will have on
United States export licensing laws and policy. For example, Spain and
Portugal restrict the transfer of technology, for either export, re-export,
52. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 101ST CONG., 1ST SESs., EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY: ISSUES RAISED BY 1992 INTEGRATION 77-78 (Comm. Print 1989).
53. See The Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989, Decree Law No. 348/77 (U.K.);
Technology Transfer Restrictions, Decree Regulation No. 53/77 (Port.); see also Polti, Italy
Considers Technology Export Control, DEFENSE NEWS, Nov. 13, 1989, at 34.
54. Regulation No. 2603/69, 12 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 324) 25 (1969).
55. Id. arts. 1, 2.
56. Id. arts. 1, 6.
57. See id. art. 1.
58. See id. arts. 6-9.
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or payment purposes. The controls are broad and somewhat ill defined,
but the respective governments apply them consistently. The British
government also publishes a "Security Export Control" booklet pursuant
to its Export of Goods (Control) Order of 1989. The order mandates
licensing procedures and export control policy on the trading of particu-
lar goods.5 9 The booklet, designed to explain the order, clearly states the
purpose of the law and its interrelationship to EC and United States
laws. 60
Neither Member State laws or EC regulations make reference to
COCOM, the one group originally designed for multilateral control of
the export of certain goods. 6 This lack of discussion reveals a clear in-
tent to continue a strict separation between EC regulations, Member
State laws, and COCOM policy. However, due to the nature of the
goods and services affected by the export laws, an overlap exists.
Whether this overlap will strengthen the EC, weaken the Member States,
or strengthen COCOM is unclear.
III. UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS
"Policy on export controls is... at best a compromise between con-
flicting objectives." 62
United States export policy coalesced in the post-World War II pe-
riod, when fears of the Soviet Union and its expected alliances arose.
The policy most frequently established through early legislation 63 stated
that exports to the Soviet Union and its allies were to be restricted in
order to preserve United States national security interests and foreign
policy objectives.' 4 This policy is still reflected in current legislation, in-
cluding the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA)
65
which amended existing statutes, including the Export Administration
Act (EAA).6 6 The EAA governs West-West and West-East transfers of
59. The term "particular goods" refers to those expressly listed within the order.
60. See Security Export Controls, BRIT. Bus., Mar. 3, 1989 (drafted pursuant to The Ex-
port of Goods (Control) Order 1989).
61. See supra note 17.
62. See Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 77 (statement of Mr.
John McLucas, Former Secretary of the Air Force and Executive Vice President of
COMSAT).
63. See, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (83 Stat.) 841 (precursor to Export Administration Act of 1979).
64. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2404-2405 (West Supp.
1989).
65. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 13.
66. Id. at 1347 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2403-1, 2410a (West Supp. 1989)).
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goods and services.67 It is logical, therefore, that if the EC impacts
United States export control laws, it will do so in the form of changes or
amendments to at least this particular statute. A review of the EAA and
the Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act will
demonstrate the flaws in the existing system.
A. Export Administration Act of 197968
1. The Statute
The Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA) controls the export
and re-export of dual use items69 in West-West and West-East trade.
The Act itself outlines licensing procedures7°and defines those goods sub-
ject to the procedures.71 The Department of Commerce Export Adminis-
tration Act regulations further clarify and implement the terms and
requirements of the statute.72
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) re-
vised the EAA with both substantive and contradictory changes. The
67. The number of statutes governing United States exports is ever growing, although the
EAA and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2751-2796d (West Supp.
1989), represent the major statutes applied to export transactions. The AECA controls the
export of defense services as well as foreign military sales between the West and the East. Id.
§§ 2753, 2761-2765. The International Traffic in Arms regulations (ITARs) define the proce-
dures and goods or services to which the AECA applies. 22 C.F.R. § 120-120.25 (1989). The
primary method of controlling exports of defense goods and services is through the United
States Munitions List. The controls on defense goods and services, since directly related to the
defense or national security of the United States, are stringently applied. The application of
controls, as with the EAA, is consistently applied as well. If the items appear on the Muni-
tions List, the items may not be exported under a license by the newly created Center for
Defense Trade, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Department of State. 22 C.F.R. § 123.1
(1989); see also State Dept. Plans Reorganization to Have Greater Role Over Defense Trade,
[8 No. 2] Inside U.S. Trade 1, 2 (Jan. 12, 1990) [hereinafter State Dept. Plans].
Congress recently proposed legislation, which has passed the House and been sent to the
Senate. This legislation, presently in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, would recon-
struct certain sections of the AECA, notably the applications and procedures relating to for-
eign military sales (FMS). See H.R. 2655, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989). The new law would
tangentially affect the commercial export of defense articles or defense services, but would
substantially alter the structure, purpose, and use of the FMS program. In addition, the new
statute if enacted would redefine export policy, thereby re-opening previously closed commer-
cial markets. See id. tit. 7. The new act would rename the AECA the "Defense Trade and
Export Control Act." Id. tit. 1.
68. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West Supp. 1989).
69. Dual use items are those goods with both a commercial and military application. See
Comment, Failures in the Interagency Administration of National Security Export Controls, 19
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 537, 542 (1987).
70. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2403, 2403-1 (West Supp. 1989).
71. Id. §§ 2403(b), 2415(3), (4), (5).
72. 15 C.F.R. § 769-769.8 (1989).
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changes were not surprising since reforms to the EAA's restrictions had
been discussed in great detail in hearings throughout 1986 and 1987.
Much of the congressional review revolved around the impact that
Gorbachev's new approach to the West and reduction of military buildup
would have on existing United States export control laws.7 s Concern
arose over whether continued restrictions on the export of technology or
other dual use items was justified.74 In fact, several industry spokesmen
testified that the licensing controls applied by the Commerce, State and
Defense Departments are archaic and anachronistic, 75 designed to lessen
United States competitiveness rather than enhance it. They stated that
blind denial of licenses under outdated foreign policy controls is anticom-
petitive and destructive to United States interests.76
Several policy changes were incorporated into the EAA through the
OTCA amendments. Among the most important were changes in sec-
tion 2404(c), requiring the executive branch to remove most West-West
licenses on goods exported to those countries with "effective" export con-
trol regimes.77 The Commerce Department was designated to analyze
73. See generally Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 13, at
1547.
74. Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 137-52; see also Export
Controls Hearings, supra note 11, at 3-41, 65-88, 176-86, 187-202, 235-53. See generally En-
forcement of Multilateral Export Controls, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy
and Trade of the House Foreign Affs. Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1987). But see HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES: BARRIERS TO U.S. EXPORTS 26
(Comm. Print 99-BB, 1986) (discussing barriers to United States trade and competitiveness
other than United States export control policies).
75. Statements from the Business Roundtable, Focus on the Future: A Global Export Con-
trol Framework (Jan. 24, 1990). "Focus on the Future" is a Roundtable report released in
February 1990. It discusses the industry views of existing export controls and methods for
improvement. See Business Roundtable Recommends Expanded Commerce Role on Export
Controls, [8 No. 4] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 8 (Jan. 26, 1990). Even today, spokespersons for high
tech firms, however, continue to feel that change within the export control system is much too
slow. Business Group Proposes Major Changes in Export Control Policy Regulations, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (bNA) No. 4, at 117 (Jan. 24, 1990). Those firms marketing and selling advanced
microchips, computers, or other such systems contend that any form of cumbersome, multi-
layered licensing process unduly delays business and unfairly hinders competition. Id. The
licensing structure results in numerous examples of American goods or products being engi-
neered "out" of other goods. See Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at
25-26, 208-09, 225, 246-47.
The field advances so quickly that any good produced is a perishable asset. As such,
industry spokespersons suggest that a "license-free zone" is the best solution to offset contin-
ued deterioration of United States trade standing and the concept of "designing out" United
States goods or parts. Otteman, Business Group to Push Strict COCOM Rules, "License-Free"
West-West Trade, [8 No. 1] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 2 (Jan. 5, 1990).
76. See Otteman, supra note 75, at 1, 2.
77. 50 U.S.C.A. § 2404(c) (West Supp. 1989).
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existing export control laws of United States allies to determine whether
their export control frameworks adequately protect against unauthorized
diversion of goods to the Soviet Union or East bloc nations.78 This anal-
ysis was conducted to provide the eventual decontrol of goods and elimi-
nation of licenses to select countries. The statutory requirements will be
implemented by regulations from the Commerce Department to be is-
sued in February or March of 1990. 7 1 The regulations are expected to
drop licensing requirements for most trade with COCOM member coun-
tries, Finland, and Switzerland. 80 The statutory change and ensuing reg-
ulations stem primarily from the fact that close to ninety-nine percent of
the applications for licenses on goods destined for West European
COCOM countries are approved.81 Such a high approval rate renders
the continued requirement for licenses inefficient, counterproductive, and
unnecessary.82
A second change to the EAA emphasized the need for further nego-
tiations with COCOM members to develop more effective multilateral
export controls. 83 Extensive research by the National Academy of Sci-
ences (NAS) led to the conclusion that unilateral export controls no
longer protect United States interests, security, or industry. The NAS
study concluded that the United States no longer maintains a sufficient
commercial advantage to justify the continued use of unilateral export
controls.84 Based on this report and the fear of a continued decline in
United States competitiveness in the export arena, Congress amended
section 2404(i) to include mandated negotiations designed to eventually
eliminate all unilateral controls.85 These incorporated changes were ex-
tensively discussed in hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee throughout 1986 and 1987.86
However, none of these changes were as drastic as industry had
78. Id.
79. Commerce to Issue Rules Next Month Decontrolling Bulk of West- West Trade, 7 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 66-67 (Jan. 17, 1990).
80. Id. at 66.
81. 1id; see also Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 139, 146
(statement of the Hon. Les AuCoin, Representative in Congress from Oregon).
82. As Representative Les AuCoin noted in his prepared statement before the Subcom-
mittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, why should export licenses continue to be
required if over ninety-nine percent of them are going to be approved? Id. The additional
burden placed on exporters to comply with this paperwork simply cuts further into any com-
petitive edge a United States company may have.
83. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(i) (West Supp. 1989).
84. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, supra note 22, at 15-45.
85. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(i)(6), (7) (West Supp. 1989).
86. See generally Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 1L 1987, supra note 4.
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hoped. Conflicting congressional views on certain industry opinions,
such as the dismantling of the export system, establishing a "license-free
zone," or eliminating all export and re-export licenses to COCOM desti-
nations resulted in slow paced approaches to amending the EAA. For
example, Senator William Proxmire felt that the export system should
not be dismantled or restructured simply because it is mismanaged.
8 7
Under this philosophy, even the changes to the EAA achieved through
the OTCA were not well-received, although some substantive changes
were enacted. Congress held certain revisions, such as the implementa-
tion of new regulations governing re-exports into participating COCOM
countries,88 to be crucial to United States interests, and approved them
more readily. Other changes have not been approved. For example, the
regulations governing exports to the Kama River and ZIL truck facilities
have long been under review as outdated.89 Yet licenses are still rou-
tinely denied because of State Department foreign policy restrictions to
these two destinations, although most of the technology sought for ex-
port is available elsewhere in the world.9"
Other members of Congress, such as Representative Howard
Berman, for example, advocate a faster, more efficient adjustment to the
export system, especially in the re-export arena, where United States al-
lies' dissatisfaction with the application of re-export controls continues.9'
In addition, certain Representatives appear extremely receptive to indus-
try requests for "license-free zones" to various COCOM destinations.92
The competing views of slow versus drastic change are reflected in the
statute.
The EAA, while designed to protect United States security interests
and to promote trade,93 has experienced difficulties due to its competing
87. See Export Controls Hearings, supra note 11, at 17 ("So we in Congress must be care-
ful not to dismantle a program that really is essential to our national security because of frus-
tration over the way the program is managed or mismanaged.")
88. See 15 C.F.R. § 774.2 (1989).
89. Telephone conversation with Mr. John Hopper, Office of Technology and Policy
Analysis, Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce (June 23, 1989).
90. Id. The Department of Commerce issued final regulations removing all foreign policy
controls to the Kama River and ZIL Truck Plants in the Soviet Union on January 31, 1990.
Removal of Foreign Policy Controls on Exports to Kama River and ZIL Truck Plants in the
Soviet Union, 55 Fed. Reg. 3,204 (1990). The effective date of the regulations is January 21,
1990, so all export requests prior to that date will be denied. Id. It is a sad commentary on the
level of bureaucratization extant in the executive branch that such a change was so long in
coming.
91. Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 90-91, 139.
92. Business Group to Push Strict COCOM Rules, 'License-Free' West- West Trade, [8 No.
1] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1 (Jan. 5, 1990).
93. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2402(1), (2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1989).
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goals. The approach of 1992 has reinforced these problems, emphasizing
that unless steps are taken to reduce existing licensing procedures and
remove a large number of security or foreign policy controls, the United
States is slated to continue its downward competitive slide.
2. The European View
Neither the EC nor individual Member States have the complex se-
ries of export controls found in the United States. No multi-state export
policy exists. No over-bureaucratized licensing procedures abound. And
no multilayered policy, national security or otherwise, exists. Moreover,
the EC as a whole does not actually participate in controlling exports of
goods to the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc94 since its founding treaty
does not provide for this control. COCOM protects against and governs
restrictions on international diversions or illegal trade of strategic or crit-
ical goods. The United States level of administrative control over busi-
ness, plus the controls of COCOM, boggle and perturb the European
mind. As the EC moves towards economic integration, the likelihood is
great that there will be a move to reduce administrative barriers within
the Community. It is probable that the EC will agree to a license-free
zone within the EC and among COCOM members. Such ideas have al-
ready been considered and are presently under review for
implementation.95
Whether the United States can continue to control exports and re-
exports through existing mechanisms remains to be seen. It is this au-
thor's opinion that the existence of such controls, plus the insistence on
extraterritorial application of United States re-export authorization, can-
not continue.
B. Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act96
The Multilateral Export Control Enhancement Amendments Act
(Export Control Act), passed as part of the OTCA, authorizes the sanc-
tioning of those foreign persons who conduct certain transactions with
the Soviet Union or the Eastern bloc as proscribed by the Export Control
Act. In pertinent part, the statute provides for sanctions if the President
determines that:
94. E.g., Trade Tensions Between U.S., Europe Seen Rising Over Controls on Sensitive Ex-
ports, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 119, 119-20 (Jan. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Trade
Tensions].
95. See, e.g., U.S. Official Concedes Divisions within COCOM, Denies U.S. Isolation, 6 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1402, 1409 (Nov. 1, 1989).
96. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a (West Supp. 1989).
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(1) a foreign person has violated any regulation issued by a country to
control exports for national security purposes pursuant to the agree-
ment of... [COCOM], and
(2) such violation has resulted in substantial enhancement of Soviet
and East bloc capabilities... to represent a serious adverse impact on
the strategic balance of forces.
9 7
The violator may be subject to a two to five year prohibition on con-
tracting with or procuring from the United States, or importing into the
United States any product produced by the sanctioned person.98 Some
exceptions exist, although the statute provides the President with the
broadest possible authority to seek out and punish violators. 99
It is of interest that the Export Control Act perpetuates the extrater-
ritorial application of United States law against United States allies and
other trading partners. Congress passed the Export Control Act in re-
sponse to the Toshiba-Konigsberg disaster,"° and chose to legislate
broadly. This policy choice may have been imprudent, given that the
United States no longer maintains a monopoly in any one industry."'
Such a move has placed United States allies and other trading partners in
the uncomfortable and unnecessary position of protesting these
restrictions.
The Export Control Act defines "sanctioned person" as "a foreign
person, and any parent, affiliate, subsidiary, or successor entity of the
foreign person, upon whom sanctions have been imposed."'0 2 In addi-
97. Id. § 2410a(a)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. See id. § 2410a(h).
100. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-463, 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS § 8092 (102 Stat.) 2270, 2270-34; Multilateral Export Control
Enhancement Amendments Act, Pub. L. 100-418, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
§§ 2441-2443 (102 Stat.) 1364, 1364-66. In 1987 it was disclosed that both Toshiba and Ko-
nigsberg Vaapenfabrikk exported sensitive submarine and antisubmarine warfare technology
to the Soviet Union. This technology substantially enhanced Soviet submarine capabilities and
directly injured United States submarine and antisubmarine potential. Comment, supra note
17, at 866 n.22. In response to the admitted violation of COCOM export procedures and
Japanese and Danish export laws, Congress passed a statute sanctioning both companies as
well as their subsidiaries, affiliates, and successors for a three to five year period. The sanctions
included prohibitions against contracting with or importing into the United States any product
produced by the sanctioned parties. Id.
In their zeal, however, Congress declared the need to deter and punish future similar
violations which may damage United States security interests or enhance Soviet security abili-
ties. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a (West Supp. 1989). Their enthusiasm resulted in the pas-
sage of section 2410a imposing sanctions on foreign persons who violate the statute.
101. See, e.g., Export Control Hearings, supra note 11, at 44; Omnibus Trade Hearings of
Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 262-63.
102. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a(e)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
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tion, the Export Control Act further clarifies the term "foreign person"
as "any person other than a United States person," 103 specifically exclud-
ing United States companies except in the most attenuated
circumstances.
The passage of the Export Control Act flies in the face of the pur-
ported removal of export restrictions and extraterritorial application of
United States laws propounded by executive, industry, and congressional
spokespersons. 04 It undercuts United States allies' ability to credit, as
serious, United States policies to integrate and simplify the export pro-
cess. In fact, it simply presents another manifestation of congressional
inability to accept the changed international market and the United
States position within that market. Thus, it appears that the economic
integration of the EC and European discomfort over extraterritorial ap-
plication of United States laws did not influence this export statute. And
given the rapid changes presently occurring within the Soviet Union and
the Eastern Bloc, this statute may already be outdated and ineffective.
IV. THE IMPACT OF EC 1992
The EC has a combined population of 320 million, about 90 million
more than the United States. Although the GNP of the EC is about
eighty percent the size of the U.S. economy, the EC as a unit is the
largest trade bloc in the world. Total exports and imports of the EC
(including intra-EC trade) are more than two and one-half times larger
than those of the United States. 105
Given the complexity and strength of the European market, it ap-
pears inevitable that the completion of the European economic union will
have some impact on the United States. In the case of United States
export control laws, that impact has manifested itself through an acceler-
ation of changes the United States has contemplated for the past five
years.
A. Impact
1. United States Export Laws and COCOM
The integration of the EC will not result in the dismantling of the
United States export control framework. However, the integration will
103. Id § 2410a0).
104. See generally Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 4; cf Commerce
to Issue Rules Next Month De-Controlling Bulk of West-West Trade, 53 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 4, at 122 (Jan. 22, 1990).
105. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 74, at 40.
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speed the implementation of much needed extensive reform. For the past
six or seven years both the executive branch and Congress have consid-
ered the ideas of reforming the licensing procedure, the apjgroval process,
and the appeals process.106 However, each time serious or substantial
reforms were mentioned, such as Senator Jake Gan's bill to consolidate
export controls into one new agency,10 7 both branches balked at the
changes, citing the "evil Soviet empire," the entrenchment of existing
procedures, or the misguided approach to export control reform. 108 The
results were that no effective changes to the major export statutes were
made until 1988.109
Although no real policy or substantive changes occurred to the
EAA until 1988, there were discussions on refining COCOM, its func-
tions, and its various control lists."' Perhaps COCOM will be most in-
fluenced by the economic integration of the EC. Not only is each
member of the EC (with the exception of Ireland) a member of
COCOM, 111 but several European nations have consistently called for a
substantial removal of items from the International List.112 Thus, as the
EC moves closer to one economic mind, it may also move closer to one
106. See, e.g., Polsky, supra note 11, at 25. Senators John Heinz and Jake Gan introduced
legislation to streamline the export process. S. 1796, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1989). This
legislation is not the first of its kind. As in the past, the bill advocates the formation of a new
agency, the Office of Stategic Trade and Technology, designed to handle all export control
responsibilities. Id. The one office would avoid continued interagency fighting over export
jurisdiction and decision-making. See Special Report: The Outlook for Legislative Activity Af-
fecting Defense, Space, and Procurement Policy, 53 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 130, 133
(Jan. 22, 1990) [hereinafter Special Report]. As with the prior legislation, this bill also failed
due to the strenuous objections of the Departments of Defense, State and Commerce. Id.
107. Senator Garn proposed the consolidation of the Commerce, State, and Defense De-
partment export licensing functions into one Office of Strategic Trade. See S. 1796, supra note
106, § 15. Although his proposal has not been adopted, some agencies, such as the State De-
partment, have reorganized and consolidated their export control functions. See State Dept
Plans, supra note 67, at 1, 2 (consolidation into the Center for Defense Trade, Office of Polit-
ico-Military Affairs).
108. See Special Report, supra note 106.
109. Authorization for renewal of the Export Administration Act of 1979 has passed every
year since then, including amendments in 1981, 1985, and 1988. No substantial changes oc-
curred until the passage of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988 in August of
1988. In addition, business and industry voice strenuous objections on continued reauthoriza-
tion of the EAA despite charges expressed in the OTCA amendments. See Industry Groups to
Call for 1990 Reauthorization of Export Control Regime, [7 No. 50] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 2
(Dec. 15, 1989).
110. See, e.g., Mosbacher Foresees, supra note 24; Easing COCOM Restrictions, supra note
24; U.S. Official Concedes Divisions Within COCOM, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at
1408 (Nov. 1, 1989).
111. See supra note 18.
112. Easing COCOM Restrictions, supra note 24. The International List is the multilateral
list through which controls over enumerated goods are exercised.
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political mind. This shift could force the United States to regard West-
ern Europe as one international partner, rather than twelve individual
COCOM members.
The twelve nations of the EC may choose to pursue a loosening of
restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union and its allies, viewing such
action not only as economically beneficial, but politically propitious. If
that is the case, the United States may be faced with a voting bloc of
twelve members of COCOM all actively pursuing removal of existing re-
strictions. The twelve member EC would be forced to work through
COCOM since the EC economic charter does not allow for specific EC
control over exports to the Soviet Union and its allies.113 While not for-
midable, such a bloc could make retention of continued restrictions diffi-
cult to maintain despite the United States position.
Alternatively, COCOM could completely breakdown if the United
States and the EC members do not agree on the type and level of controls
necessary for protection against diversion. Although the dismantling or
breakdown of COCOM is a theoretical possibility, this author considers
the likelihood of such action as slim. COCOM has been in effect since
1949 and represents a viable diplomatic solution to the control of critical
technologies. Dismantling COCOM would be analogous to "throwing
the baby out with the bath water." As such, it is more likely that the
United States and the EC members will work within the framework of
COCOM rather than eliminating it.
United States lawmakers are only beginning to focus serious ener-
gies and efforts on the true potential and future of COCOM. Recent
legislation cites the detrimental effect that burdensome, restrictive, and
antiquated controls have on United States competitiveness,1 14 plus the
advantages of multilateral export mechanisms. Congress has recognized
the need to streamline export procedures to account for additional com-
petition from the EC,115 such as through the lifting of restrictions on
goods and technology going to Western Europe.116
In this vein, the executive branch has urged Congress to strengthen
COCOM by easing export controls within the United States, purging the
COCOM International List, and implementing a series of common stan-
113. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 9-37, at 85-93.
114. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401 (6), (10)-(12) (West Supp. 1989).
115. See Trade Tensions, supra note 94, at 119-20.
116. Id.; See eg., 15 C.F.R. § 771.24 (1989) (establishment of a G-COCOM license appli-
cable to exports to Cooperating Countries); See also Requests for Comments on the Effects of
Lifting Foreign Policy-Based Export Controls, 54 Fed. Reg. 47,994 (1989); accord Silverberg,
Rules Ease U.S. Trade with COCOM, DEFENSE NEws, July 17, 1989, at 27.
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dards for defining items which belong on the International List.117 In a
move toward the "multilateralization" of controls, recent regulations
provide special exemptions for both exports and re-exports of goods to
COCOM member countries.11 The Department of Commerce estab-
lished a G-COCOM license strictly for use with export of particular
goods to COCOM member countries. 119 Furthermore, Congress has
stated in clear terms the importance of reinforcing COCOM's unifying
policies and rules.120 All these changes and amendments have occurred
concomitantly with the integration of the European Community.
Each of these steps forward has had its true genesis in the fear that
United States laws would become so outdated that United States com-
mercial interests would suffer. Through integration, the EC has suc-
ceeded in convincing the United States that continued strong-arming and
extraterritorial application of United States laws will be detrimental to
United States interests.
2. United States Re-export Laws and their Extraterritorial
Application
The EC will have its greatest impact on United States re-export
laws. 21 As noted earlier, Commerce Department regulations provide for
special G-COCOM licenses,1 22 and special regulations govern re-export
of goods to COCOM members. 23 Despite this enlightened approach in
accepting the need for multilateral controls and an easing of United
States unilateral controls, Congress passed the Multilateral Export Con-
trol Enhancement Amendments Act (Export Control Act) 124 as part of
the OTCA. As noted above, the Export Control Act imposes sanctions
on foreign persons who violate COCOM controls by exporting or re-ex-
porting technologies, critical or otherwise, to the Soviet Union or Eastern
bloc. 25 The export of these technologies must result in substantial en-
hancement of Soviet or Eastern bloc military capabilities, 26 resulting in
117. See U.S. Official Presses European Community to "Respect" COCOM Process as 1992
Nears, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1296, 1296-97 (Oct. 11, 1989).
118. See Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 4; see also 15 C.F.R. § 774
(1988).
119. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (1988).
120. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404(i) (West Supp. 1989).
121. Id.; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text.
122. See Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 4.
123. See id.
124. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410a (West Supp. 1989).
125. Id. § 2410a(a)(2); see supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
126. Id. § 2410a(b)(2).
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a serious, adverse impact on the strategic balance of forces. 127 Since the
statute is designed to punish "foreign persons," it represents another at-
tempt at extraterritorial application of United States laws under the guise
of multilateral cooperation. Although section 2442(3) refers to all gov-
ernments participating in COCOM, section 2442(5) clearly imposes this
type of export control on any foreign person, other than a United States
person, in order to protect United States national security interests.
12
1
Such a statute will most likely be unenforceable against EC mem-
bers once all trade barriers are removed. Without intra-European bor-
ders and some COCOM agreement on restrictions, the United States will
lose re-export control. Goods will move virtually uninhibited from
Member State to Member State once they enter the EC. Some EC regu-
lations and directives allow for an office of entry review of goods trans-
versing Member States, but the review is more or less a formality.
Although the EC and individual Member States have existing export
control laws, 129 these will be modified or repealed in order to implement
the free movement of goods directives, which will be a step further to-
wards removing all checks to intra-EC movement. While not all restric-
tions will be removed,' 30 those affecting technology and other strategic
goods will most likely merge with COCOM restrictions or disappear.
In addition, most European nations will not be interested in imple-
menting further restrictions to their existing export directive or individ-
ual Member States' laws when COCOM may be used to prevent the
transfer of critical technology to the Soviet Union or its allies, or who-
ever the next "enemy" may be.' COCOM was designed specifically to
protect the improper export or diversion of goods and technologies.
Given the dramatically changing climate within the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc, and the natural affinity which Western Europe feels toward
Eastern Europe, 13 2 even COCOM restrictions may eventually become
obsolete. The Soviet Union no longer represents a massive military
127. Id.
128. I § 2410a(a)(1).
129. See McIntyre & Cupitt, supra note 17, at 82.
130. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 36, at 93.
131. But see European Community Members Closely Guard Independence on Defense Is-
sues, INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Sept. 29, 1989, at 13, 13-14 (discussing a white paper drafted by
the Center for Strategic and International Studies entitled Defense Implications for EC 92 that
concluded that EC members may want to retain greater autonomy than expected in defense
issues and utilize the EC economic integration less in that area); see also De Briganti, French
Aerospace Industry to Propose Relaxed Export Restrictions, DEFENSE NEWs, Oct. 16, 1989, at
43 (discussing a streamlining of procedures and controls of existing French export laws).
132. Witness the jubilation over the removal of the Berlin Wall. It appears that West
Europeans are anxious to remove additional stress brought on by prior political differences.
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threat to Europe. Eastern Europe is slowly undergoing the process of
democratization. President Gorbachev's reforms are market oriented.
His unilateral reduction in military forces, withdrawal from Afghanistan,
and increased tolerance of political freedoms within the Soviet Union
have begun to convince Western Europe that the Soviets should be
helped and not hindered in obtaining important goods and technology. 133
B. Solutions
1. Repeal of Re-Export Laws
What solution exists for the United States short of isolation? First,
the United States may wish to repeal its re-export statutory framework,
either on the theory that it is not worth the continued foreign policy
aggravation caused by the extraterritorial reach of the statutes, or that
the statutes are no longer effective since they are virtually ignored by
United States allies. In addition, the majority of goods controlled by re-
export authorization may be readily available from foreign sources, so
the existing re-export laws simply undercut United States competitive-
ness and antagonize United States allies. 134 A repeal of re-export control
laws would also indicate good faith efforts on the part of the United
States to compete on even terms with COCOM allies.
Perhaps a repeal of United States re-export control laws would be in
the best interests of the United States government, United States indus-
try, and the EC. The pressure for repeal is great. Overreaching on the
part of the United States has rendered United States attempts at control
useless, and United States laws unenforceable.1 35 The United States may
best influence EC members through other international organizations,
treating the EC more as an equal than as a subordinate. All indications
See EC Official Says East Germany Could Join Community if Certain Conditions Are Met, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1518, 1518-19 (Nov. 22, 1989).
133. See Cody, Soviets, EC Sign 10-year Trade Pact, Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1989, at
D1, col. 4. But see Silverberg, European Commission Chief Urges Caution in Trade with East
Bloc, DEFENSE NEWS, June 19, 1989, at 8.
134. The European Community has consistently chafed over the extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States laws. In some instances, the European Community has banded together
to ignore United States objections. See, e.g., Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra
note 6, at 16 (statement of the Hon. Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary for Trade Admin.
Dep't of Commerce) (discussing the need for removal of foreign policy controls on the Euro-
pean-Soviet gas pipeline venture of 1982-1984); see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 2410a(b) (West Supp.
1989). United States allies, expecially COCOM members, have described United States con-
trols as both "excessive" and "irritating." See Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 1L 1987,
supra note 6, at 208-09; Hearings, supra note 91, at 44.
135. See supra note 134.
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point to the need for the United States government to step back and reas-
sess its general position..,
2. License-Free Zone
The United States should move with alacrity towards establishing a
"license-free zone" between itself and other COCOM members or coop-
erating countries. The most important reason for this reform is that re-
moval of all intra-EC barriers would leave United States companies at a
great economic disadvantage should they alone be bound by cumbersome
licensing requirements.' 36 In addition, United States trade with
COCOM accounts for such an overwhelming percentage of its total an-
nual trade that the cost of the procedures seriously burdens United States
industry. The license-free zone concept would provide United States
firms with similar advantages possessed by other COCOM allies. This
idea has also been considered since early 1987.117
3. Formalization of COCOM
The United States should focus its efforts on strengthening COCOM
and its enforcement mechanisms. COCOM should be formalized
through a treaty which integrates existing export control agreements and
reflects changes in policy regarding the "new Eastern bloc."
COCOM should meet and establish a common, workable definition
for essential terms: "critical technology," "strategic technology," and
"technology." Once agreed upon, the definitions must be integrated into
existing COCOM Member States national laws. In those instances when
the COCOM definitions and existing laws are incompatible or vary, then
national laws should fall to the COCOM definition. The ultimate goal
should be to produce one set of export controls, adopted by all COCOM
members.
The adoption of one consistent statute will provide the basis for the
license-free zone which both United States industry and West European
governments have advocated. Similarity in definition and enforcement
provisions would guarantee "effective" export control as needed and
would engender the necessary trust between allies integral to successful
trading relationships. COCOM then would provide a uniform multilat-
eral approach to export control, much more readily manageable and
designed to work in tandem with the license-free zone concept.
136. Business Group to Push Strict COCOM Rules, "License-Free" West-West Trade, [8 No.
1] INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 2-3 (Jan. 5, 1990).
137. See Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, passim.
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Lastly, COCOM should consider adjusting its status from voluntary
to mandatory. Enforcement mechanisms should implement agreed upon
controls. Once concurrence among the members exists and enforcement
mechanisms have been established, treaty status will provide the final
formalization to enforce export restrictions. Enforcement authority will
render the approach to controls truly multilateral.
In addition, it may be beneficial for the United States and the EC to
incorporate certain aspects of the Military Critical Technology Re-
gime... into a COCOM treaty, drawing on the restrictions already
agreed upon by seven of seventeen members. United States allies may be
more willing to negotiate and draft enforcement mechanisms when com-
mon denominators already exist.
These changes will ultimately result in greater competition and in-
creased competitiveness-necessary prerequisites to continued United
States recovery in the world marketplace.
V. CONCLUSION
Effective changes to the export control regime have been contem-
plated since at least 1984. The decline of United States competitiveness,
especially in the high-tech industry,'39 juxtaposed with the increased
power and potential of an integrated EC, forced the United States into
suggesting more and more adjustments to the export laws. Thus, EC
138. The Military Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was originally signed in 1987 by
the United States, Italy, France, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.
The MTCR which is a binding executive agreement, bans the export of missiles or their com-
ponents, technology, or related equipment. The ban is not country or end-user specific, but
rather is based on the idea of preventing the wholesale proliferation of missile technology.
Thus, exports by France to Brazil would violate the MTCR, although Brazil is not a country
with whom the United States normally has hostile, difficult, or aggressive export controls. See,
e.g., Lardner, White House in "Intense" Talks With France Over Alleged MTCR Violations,
INSIDE THE PENTAGON, Oct. 20, 1989, at 5; see also Ottaway, U.S. Firms Helped Iraq Gain
Ability to Make Missiles, Officials Say, Washington Post, May 3, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
Sanctions against those who violate the MTCR have recently been proposed by Rep.
Howard Berman. H.R. 963, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Modification to Amendment H.R.
963 (1989) (available through Hastings International and Comparative Law Review). These
proposed sanctions indicate the seriousness with which the United States views cessation of
nuclear proliferation.
The MTCR identifies the critical nuclear technology which cannot by exported. It is that
type of updated specificity of definition which should be incorporated into a COCOM treaty.
Moreover, a more frequent review period-i.e., every three months- should also be memori-
alized into any COCOM treaty.
139. In 1986 the United States high tech industry posted its first ever trade deficit. The
shock of the loss of the United States competitive edge is continuing to have economic ramifi-
cations well into 1990. Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 137-38
(statement of the Hon. Les AuCoin, Representative in Congress from Oregon).
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integration did not directly enter the equation, except perhaps to expedite
a process mired in inaction due to the conflicting interests of the Com-
merce, State, and Defense Departments in controlling United States
exports.
With the onset of Europe as the largest internal market in the world,
and the increase in competitiveness of the European industrial base, the
United States must realize that its negative trade balance will only in-
crease unless immediate measures are enacted to implement the policy
proposals sought since 1984.
While the unification of Europe has not totally influenced the export
control framework in the United States, it has placed the re-export re-
gime at risk of total ineffectiveness. Once the economic integration is
complete, internal border controls will disappear.Y" Goods destined for
any EC member can pass through to other members, and ultimately out
of the Community, without notice to or permission from the United
States. Thus, re-export authorization will no longer be enforced after
integration.
The European Community states have long objected to this imposi-
tion of re-export authorization, and may effectively use economic unifica-
tion as the rationale to escape United States re-export laws.141 The
United States, therefore, must consider eliminating these laws in favor of
a multilateral approach best achieved through COCOM and EC Member
States retaining national export control laws.
The concept of the elimination of re-export laws is not new to
United States lawmakers.14 Eminent scholars, business leaders, and
government spokespersons have long discussed the failure of re-export
policy and the viability of multilateral cooperation in export matters. 143
The EC integration has simply forced the United States to face the eco-
nomic and political reality of the loss of re-export control. The executive
branch will have to rely on diplomatic efforts to achieve rapid multilat-
eral cooperation regarding diversion and re-export, prior to completely
losing the remaining influence it may exercise over its allies.
The approach of the 1992 deadline has been met with both anticipa-
tion and skepticism by the United States. 1" The movement towards a
unified market has caused the United States to re-evaluate its goals and
140. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 121-131 and accompanying text.
142. Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 11, 1987, supra note 6, at 90-91.
143. Id. at 145, 165-66, 171, 209.
144. United States is Reassessing its Opinion of EC 1992 Plan, Commerce Official Says, 6
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1632 (Dec. 13, 1989); Reaction "Touchy"on Implications of
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policies toward the export of goods and services to both Western and
Eastern bloc countries. Although the re-evaluation continues, change
has been slow. Fewer than ten pieces of legislation have even attempted
to reform or reframe existing, outdated export laws.145 The United
States must begin implementing updated legislation more quickly as the
European Community finalizes its trade barrier removal.
The United States should contribute to the strengthening of
COCOM while seriously reducing its own existing export control regime.
The reduction must not be unilateral, but reciprocal, as COCOM gains in
authority and enforcement capacity. A multilateral agreement on
COCOM will go far in maintaining a steady balance between the United
States and its allies, and will still allow the United States a strong say in
the control of exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc. United
States technological leadership has peaked and is now on the wane.
Regaining that leadership again requires decisive, swift, and measured
action.
Unified Europe, WASHINGTON TRADE WEEK, Oct. 31, 1989, at 4; accord Europe Surprised
Over U.S. Reluctance on "1992", WASHINGTON TRADE WEEK, Oct. 31, 1989, at 5.
145. Omnibus Trade Hearings of Mar. 1L 1987, supra note 6, passim; Export Control Hear-
ings, supra note 11, passim.
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